Expired Pointer Dereference Affecting kernel-zfcpdump-modules-internal package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL8-KERNELZFCPDUMPMODULESINTERNAL-20095485
- published24 Sept 2026
- disclosed11 Sept 2026
Introduced: 11 Sep 2026
NewCVE-2026-89763 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for RHEL:8 kernel-zfcpdump-modules-internal.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-zfcpdump-modules-internal package and not the kernel-zfcpdump-modules-internal package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering
trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.
The current order permits this interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1 trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted") put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal() kfree(digests) pcrlock() unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)
CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89 Call Trace: tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted] trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted] trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted] __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0 __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50 __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310 Allocated by task 88: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490 do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390 do_init_module+0x2df/0x840 Freed by task 90: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted] __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510
Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the backend state is destroyed.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-89763
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f7541afbc57fe9d26769a22c31d8ce8790c9a19
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/753c978f2400f9783eb524842a975d3ac950d511
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d67b4acbfc7af331d887a8efc04bef6573b8a7a