The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsThere is no fixed version for RHEL:8 nodejs:24/v8-13.6-devel.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream nodejs:24/v8-13.6-devel package and not the nodejs:24/v8-13.6-devel package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
undici is an HTTP client library for Node.js. In versions 4.2.1 through 6.29.0, 7.0.0 through 7.30.0, and 8.0.0 through 8.12.1, the client process crashes when a TLS 1.2 server renegotiates after the connection is established and presents a different, CA-trusted certificate whose hostname does not match the requested host. Node.js re-runs hostname verification on the renegotiated handshake and destroys the socket with a certificate-altname error, but undici's established-socket error handler asserted that this error code could never occur, so the peer-controlled error became an uncaught assertion that terminates the Node.js process, affecting both the HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 paths. A malicious or compromised HTTPS endpoint reached through undici or the global fetch() can crash the client with a single server-initiated renegotiation, taking down all in-flight requests and background work in the process, and exploitation needs no CA compromise because the attacker controls the endpoint and can present two ordinary valid certificates. Only TLS 1.2 is affected, since TLS 1.3 does not support renegotiation. The issue is fixed in undici 6.29.1, 7.30.1, and 8.12.2, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, restrict outbound connections to TLS 1.3 so renegotiation cannot occur, when the target endpoints support it.