Expired Pointer Dereference Affecting openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL8-OPENSHIFTOSERHELCOREOS8-22344024
- published8 Nov 2026
- disclosed2 Nov 2026
Introduced: 2 Nov 2026
NewCVE-2026-99222 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for RHEL:8 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 package and not the openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Protect the read method check against type removal
keyctl_read_key() checks key->type->read without holding key->sem. A reference keeps the key alive, but does not pin the module containing its type. A surviving RxRPC key can therefore be read while AF_RXRPC is being unloaded:
KEYCTL_READ task Module unload and key GC
lookup_user_key() permission / possession checks load key->type af_rxrpc_exit() unregister_key_type() GC: down_write(key->sem) GC: retype to key_type_dead GC: up_write(key->sem) unregister_key_type() returns free_module() read saved type's read member
The final access can read freed module storage. The read invocation in __keyctl_read_key() is already protected by key->sem, but the earlier method check is outside that critical section.
Move the method check into __keyctl_read_key(), after key_validate() and under its existing read hold on key->sem. The check and invocation then use the same protected type for length queries and every read retry. The GC cannot retype the key until the semaphore is released, and type unregistration waits for that GC pass before the module can be freed.
Return -EOPNOTSUPP when validation succeeds and the type has no read method. A temporary buffer may now be allocated before this result; allocation and copying to userspace remain outside the semaphore.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-99222
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1486caee47b4909f52835a957c3293e970113e44
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3edc064069d07e7d37359fcb4d03d3bab15ee3ab
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a36e2a1a017c51f8a8ad2a094566bad97c46a9b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf1af7df80e38bf58bd74c2cccce32fcbd1a596a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2a2deda08d91644f5e30c17d267b1cdc5f124b2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5f830ae6611cddbfc504c43f14155f60b63206a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff11cfed85cbfdd7fe1185ebd18d2c7a8353ad8d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff44f1b303aa76a818d898e85c56ed4852c031e2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/925c84e3cc21caf09de92d9bcafab0147790debf