Information Exposure Affecting openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL8-OPENSHIFTOSERHELCOREOS9-22343902
- published8 Nov 2026
- disclosed16 Sept 2026
Introduced: 16 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-89865 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for RHEL:8 openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 package and not the openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:8 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().
qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value:
if (len == 1)
opt |= BIT_0;
if (opt & BIT_0)
len = *sfp;
*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash.
Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap contents.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-89865
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09703bc7c0be3a7a155b0ff5f21f6765ba3f519c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/581590f560b74399151b3cbc88574424c2f3d2dc
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84bde5ce4038d9ad811e5c994305bbfcbd7a9f79
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97c45c75f5cdec96b1a4fba8b1d55d0dd01af1e8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a476377a66897549dd49bee319f4df66623417b7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5501c42256235523c4dddf799f032dfbf4f4c77
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b157256c28086c434afd70cc78bf9b4d8caf1276
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b47d4a1547d9ef21b2e9d1a739fe2204d4be05dc