Improper Certificate Validation The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package servicemesh-proxy-debugsource  (opens in a new tab)


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EPSS
0.52% (41st percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL8-SERVICEMESHPROXYDEBUGSOURCE-4396201
  • published26 Mar 2023
  • disclosed23 Feb 2022

Introduced: 23 Feb 2022

CVE-2022-21657  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-295  (opens in a new tab)

Amendment

The Red Hat security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for RHEL:8.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream servicemesh-proxy-debugsource package and not the servicemesh-proxy-debugsource package as distributed by RHEL.

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.