Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') Affecting kernel-headers package, versions *
Threat Intelligence
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL9-KERNELHEADERS-8380189
- published14 Nov 2024
- disclosed9 Nov 2024
Introduced: 9 Nov 2024
NewCVE-2024-50250 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for RHEL:9 kernel-headers.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-headers package and not the kernel-headers package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:9 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks
The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed.
If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will reflect this unalignment.
dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that page. This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in the file as iter->pos. Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the wrong place.
If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the destination block. This is catastrophic for data confidentiality because we expose stale pmem contents.
Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that we always copy full blocks.
We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range, so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed.
Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're operating on.
References
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-50250
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50793801fc7f6d08def48754fb0f0706b0cfc394
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e9c0f500b42216ef930f5c0d1703989a451913d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bc18bb476e50e32e5d08f2734d63d63e0fa528c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdbc96c23197d773a7d1bf03e4f11de593b0ff28