Improper Protection Against Physical Side Channels Affecting kernel-rt-modules-partner package, versions *
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-RHEL9-KERNELRTMODULESPARTNER-6520817
- published3 Apr 2024
- disclosed2 Apr 2024
Introduced: 2 Apr 2024
CVE-2024-26670 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
There is no fixed version for RHEL:9 kernel-rt-modules-partner.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-rt-modules-partner package and not the kernel-rt-modules-partner package as distributed by RHEL.
See How to fix? for RHEL:9 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.
The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295, which are described in:
- https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en
- https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en
In both cases the workaround is described as:
| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the
| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected
| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:
|
| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including
| unused contexts or addresses, such as a TLBI VALE1 Xzr.
|
| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.
The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all explicit memory accesses".
Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by an LDR, as we have:
| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | eret | alternative_else_nop_endif | | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]
This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.
The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:
| alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 | [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ] | .L_skip_tramp_exit_@: | | ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR] | add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp | | alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD | tlbi vale1, xzr | dsb nsh | alternative_else_nop_endif | eret
The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the erratum:
| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the | issue from occurring.
... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled".