Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize Affecting langfuse-3 package, versions <3.224.3-r0
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-WOLFILATEST-LANGFUSE3-18759486
- published13 Aug 2026
- disclosed13 Aug 2026
Introduced: 13 Aug 2026
NewCVE-2026-73420 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Wolfi langfuse-3 to version 3.224.3-r0 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream langfuse-3 package and not the langfuse-3 package as distributed by Wolfi.
See How to fix? for Wolfi relevant fixed versions and status.
NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, the defaultNormalizer used by the email and magic-link sign-in flow validates an address before applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character such as U+FF20 FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT that is not ASCII at-sign but canonicalizes to an ASCII at-sign under NFKC or NFKD normalization. The address passes the normalizer's single-at-sign check, but a downstream sendVerificationRequest mail library or delivery service that normalizes the address can then see two at-sign separators and deliver the passwordless sign-in link to an attacker-controlled recipient. Applications are affected when the email provider uses the built-in normalizer rather than a custom normalizeIdentifier and the downstream sender applies Unicode normalization. An attacker who knows a victim's email address can request the misrouted magic link and sign in as the victim without victim interaction. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
References
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/19d2feb24359fa8c79418907fc68d9ec8152ca94
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/a63eee12a1a20cb35209e44195b097868517b9a0
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/core@0.41.3
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@4.24.15
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32
- https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-7rqj-j65f-68wh