Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size The advisory has been revoked - it doesn't affect any version of package rv  (opens in a new tab)


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EPSS
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  • Snyk IDSNYK-CENTOS10-RV-16256162
  • published25 Apr 2026
  • disclosed24 Apr 2026

Introduced: 24 Apr 2026

CVE-2026-31630  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-131  (opens in a new tab)

Amendment

The Centos security team deemed this advisory irrelevant for Centos:10.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream rv package and not the rv package as distributed by Centos.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output

The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".

That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().

As a result, a case such as

is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so 51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.

Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the call sites to scnprintf().

Changes since v1:

  • correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case explicitly
  • frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier mapped-v4 example