The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsThere is no fixed version for Centos:10 rv.
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream rv package and not the rv package as distributed by Centos.
See How to fix? for Centos:10 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl
While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller
state machine corruption.
The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().
A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes
the arg > INT_MAX check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This
results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the
internal (int)m < 0 check in msecs_to_jiffies().
The truncated value is then assigned to client->adapter->timeout
(a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number.
When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value
undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned long, triggering the
schedule_timeout warning and causing premature returns. This leaves
the SMBus state machine in an unrecoverable state, constituting a
local Denial of Service (DoS).
Fix this by bounding the user argument to INT_MAX / 10.
[wsa: move the comment as well]