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Information Exposure Affecting asterisk package, versions <1:13.17.1~dfsg-1

Severity

 Recommended
0.0
high
0
10

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Threat Intelligence

EPSS
2.06% (90th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-DEBIAN11-ASTERISK-523004
  • published2 Sept 2017
  • disclosed2 Sept 2017
Report a new vulnerability Found a mistake?

Introduced: 2 Sep 2017

CVE-2017-14099  (opens in a new tab)
CWE-200  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

Upgrade Debian:11 asterisk to version 1:13.17.1~dfsg-1 or higher.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream asterisk package and not the asterisk package as distributed by Debian. See How to fix? for Debian:11 relevant fixed versions and status.

In res/res_rtp_asterisk.c in Asterisk 11.x before 11.25.2, 13.x before 13.17.1, and 14.x before 14.6.1 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert17 and 13.x before 13.13-cert5, unauthorized data disclosure (media takeover in the RTP stack) is possible with careful timing by an attacker. The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options (for chan_sip and chan_pjsip, respectively) enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default, but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT. A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support, this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected, the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times. If a flood of RTP traffic was received, the strict RTP support would allow the new address to provide media, and (with symmetric RTP enabled) outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic, they would continue to receive traffic as well.