Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) Affecting package, versions >=0.4.0 <0.9.0

  • Attack Complexity


  • User Interaction


  • Scope


  • Integrity


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  • snyk-id


  • published

    26 Jan 2021

  • disclosed

    26 Jan 2021

  • credit

    Chris Smowton

How to fix?

Upgrade to version 0.9.0 or higher.

Overview is an OCI Registry as storage.

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip). The directory support feature allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory, where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links. A well-crafted tarball allows malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory, unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs oras pull.


It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt

+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys