Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) Affecting github.com/karmada-io/karmada/operator/pkg/karmadactl/cmdinit/utils package, versions <1.12.0
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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- published5 Jan 2025
- disclosed3 Jan 2025
- creditUnknown
Introduced: 3 Jan 2025
NewCVE-2024-56514 Â (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade github.com/karmada-io/karmada/operator/pkg/karmadactl/cmdinit/utils to version 1.12.0 or higher.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) via the CRDs archive extraction process due to improper input validation. Exploiting this vulnerability is possible by supplying a malicious CRD file during the initialization of Karmada.
Workaround
This vulnerability can be mitigated by manually inspecting the CRD files to check for sequences such as ../ that would alter file paths, to determine if they potentially include malicious files.
Details
It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys