Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) Affecting com.alibaba.oneagent:one-java-agent-plugin package, versions [0,]
Threat Intelligence
Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-JAVA-COMALIBABAONEAGENT-2407874
- published21 Apr 2022
- disclosed21 Feb 2022
- creditAkhil Jain
Introduced: 21 Feb 2022
CVE-2022-25842 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
A fix was pushed into the master branch but not yet published.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) using a specially crafted archive that holds directory traversal filenames (e.g. ../../evil.exe). The attacker can overwrite executable files and either invoke them remotely or wait for the system or user to call them, thus achieving remote command execution on the victim’s machine.
PoC:
// ZIpslip.class
import java.io.IOException;
import com.alibaba.oneagent.utils.*;
public class ZIpslip {
public static void main(String[] args) {
try {
IOUtils.unzip("C:evil.zip", "D:zipzipzip"); //evil.zip contains ../../evil.exe
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
Details
It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys