Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsUpgrade com.linecorp.armeria:armeria-saml to version 1.42.0 or higher.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Replay Attack in the SamlAssertionConsumerFunction class, which validates the response and assertion signatures, Recipient, SubjectConfirmationData.NotOnOrAfter, InResponseTo, Conditions, and Audience, but never reads or stores assertion.getID(), so the set of consumed assertion IDs required by the SAML 2.0 Web SSO Profile is not maintained. An attacker can establish multiple authenticated sessions without a fresh IdP authentication event by posting the same signed SAML Response to the assertion consumer service endpoint repeatedly. Doing so requires first obtaining a valid signed response, through browser history, logs, a compromised client, a browser extension, a heap dump, or a capture point that is not protected by TLS, and replaying it before SubjectConfirmationData.NotOnOrAfter, a window that deployments commonly set to several minutes.