Directory Traversal Affecting org.apache.camel:camel-docling package, versions [4.15.0,4.18.5)[4.19.0,4.22.1)

Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal via the getInputPath() function in the Docling component. An attacker can make Docling fetch attacker-selected URLs or read local files, exposing sensitive data accessible to the Camel process, by sending a String message body beginning with http:// or https://, or one that begins with / or contains a backslash, to a route that forwards it to a Docling endpoint. The DoclingProducer interprets these bodies as locations without an opt-in, and the URL-fetch or local-file-read behavior is available in both CLI and docling-serve modes.

Notes

• On the local-file read path, maxFileSize defaults to 50 MiB, but its existence-guarded check skips paths that do not exist and pseudo-files reporting size zero; those sources are not bounded by that check.

Workarounds

• Do not route message bodies originating outside the deployment into Docling endpoints; this prevents attacker-controlled strings from being interpreted as remote URLs or local file paths.
• Supply documents as typed File, byte[], or InputStream bodies instead of bare strings, or use CamelDoclingInputFilePath with a trusted path; this avoids prefix-based interpretation of the message body.

A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.

Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:

• Information Disclosure: Allows the attacker to gain information about the folder structure or read the contents of sensitive files on the system.

st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.

If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.

curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa

Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).

• Writing arbitrary files: Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files. This type of vulnerability is also known as Zip-Slip.

One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.

The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:

2018-04-15 22:04:29 .....           19           19  good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 .....           20           20  ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

• Apache Jira Issues
• camel.apache.org
• GitHub Commit camel-4.18.5
• GitHub Commit camel-4.22.1
• GitHub Commit camel-4.23.0