The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsUpgrade org.springframework.ws:spring-ws-security to version 4.1.4, 5.0.2 or higher.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Replay Attack due to the Wss4jSecurityInterceptor class in Wss4jSecurityInterceptor.java not consistently wiring configured Apache WSS4J ReplayCache instances into RequestData for validation-time checks. As a result, replay protections for UsernameToken nonces and creation timestamps, Timestamp elements, and SAML one-time-use semantics are ineffective even when an operator configures a replay cache on the interceptor. An attacker who captures a valid SOAP message can re-submit it and have it accepted again, re-triggering the authenticated operation.
Note:
This is only exploitable if the attacker first captures still-valid cryptographic material and replays it within the message's acceptance window against a deployment that relies on WSS4J replay detection.
If upgrading is not possible, enable a replay cache by extending Wss4jSecurityInterceptor and overriding initializeValidationRequestData(MessageContext messageContext):
protected RequestData initializeValidationRequestData(MessageContext messageContext) {
RequestData requestData = super.initializeValidationRequestData(messageContext);
// Create ReplayCache according to your deployment scenario
requestData.setNonceReplayCache(replayCache);
requestData.setTimestampReplayCache(replayCache);
requestData.setSamlOneTimeUseReplayCache(replayCache);
return requestData;
}