The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) via the csrf() middleware's failure to validate requests with Content-Type: text/ping. The middleware only performs origin checks when the content type matches one of the three types an HTML form can send. Chromium's hyperlink auditing (<a ping>) sends a credentialed cross-origin POST with Content-Type: text/ping and no CORS preflight, which the middleware passes directly to the handler without evaluating the Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site headers. An attacker can therefore host a page that causes a visiting user in Chrome or Edge to trigger state-changing POST requests - such as logging out, deleting a resource, or toggling a setting - against any application protected by csrf(), provided the request body content is irrelevant to the action.
Note: This is only exploitable against endpoints whose effect does not depend on the request body, and requires the user's session cookie to be sent with the request (default SameSite=Lax permits this from a same-site origin, or when cookies are set with SameSite=None).
Reject requests with a Content-Type of text/ping in a middleware registered before csrf(), or set session cookies with SameSite=Strict.