The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel via two flaws in the path-prefix stripping logic of mount() and app.mount(). First, when a dynamic mount prefix such as /api/:tenant/* is used, the prefix is removed by the length of the route pattern string rather than the length of the matched prefix, so a request like /api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret is forwarded to the mounted application as /admin/secret. Second, since 4.12.21, the forwarded path is built from the decoded request path and assigned to url.pathname, which causes a decoded backslash to be normalized to / and .. sequences to be collapsed, so /app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret also reaches the mounted application as /admin/secret. In both cases the outer application routes on the original path, so path-scoped middleware such as an authentication check on /app/admin/* does not run, and an unauthenticated client can reach protected routes of the mounted application.
Note: This is only exploitable when mount() or app.mount() is used and authentication or authorization middleware is registered on a sub-path inside the mount prefix in the outer application.
Register the authentication middleware inside the mounted application instead of on a sub-path of the outer application's mount prefix.