Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) Affecting langchain package, versions <0.2.19
Threat Intelligence
Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-JS-LANGCHAIN-8310293
- published30 Oct 2024
- disclosed29 Oct 2024
- creditdastaj
Introduced: 29 Oct 2024
CVE-2024-7774 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade langchain to version 0.2.19 or higher.
Overview
langchain is a Typescript bindings for langchain
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) in the getFullPath method, which allows an attacker to save files anywhere in the filesystem through the setFileContent function, overwrite and read existing text files through the getParsedFile function, and delete files through the mdelete function.
Details
It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys