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Test your applicationsUpgrade gapless-crypto-data to version 2.16.0 or higher.
gapless-crypto-data is a Cryptocurrency OHLCV data collection with gap-free guarantee. Retrieves microstructure-enriched kline data from Binance Public Data Repository with automatic gap detection and filling.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to insufficient validation of the symbol parameter in the BinancePublicDataCollector class. The data collection routines concatenate the user-supplied symbol value directly into filesystem paths without sanitizing directory-traversal sequences. An attacker can exploit this by supplying crafted symbol values containing traversal patterns to read arbitrary files, write data outside the intended directory, or overwrite critical files, potentially leading to information disclosure, data corruption, or full system compromise.
A Directory Traversal attack (also known as path traversal) aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on file system, including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.
Directory Traversal vulnerabilities can be generally divided into two types:
st is a module for serving static files on web pages, and contains a vulnerability of this type. In our example, we will serve files from the public route.
If an attacker requests the following URL from our server, it will in turn leak the sensitive private key of the root user.
curl http://localhost:8080/public/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/root/.ssh/id_rsa
Note %2e is the URL encoded version of . (dot).
Zip-Slip.One way to achieve this is by using a malicious zip archive that holds path traversal filenames. When each filename in the zip archive gets concatenated to the target extraction folder, without validation, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicious file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys