Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) Affecting mindsdb package, versions [,23.2.1.0)
Threat Intelligence
Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-PYTHON-MINDSDB-5351796
- published31 Mar 2023
- disclosed30 Mar 2023
- creditSim4n6
Introduced: 30 Mar 2023
CVE-2023-30620 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade MindsDB to version 23.2.1.0 or higher.
Overview
MindsDB is a MindsDB server, provides server capabilities to mindsdb native python library
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip) due to an unsafe extraction which is performed using tarfile.extractall() function from a remotely retrieved tarball. This can lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location.
PoC
> tar --list -v -f archive.tar.gz
tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names
../../../sim4n6.txt
> python3
Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import tarfile
>>> with tarfile.open("archive.tar.gz") as tf:
>>> tf.extractall()
>>> exit()
> test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists"
sim4n6.txt exists
Details
It is exploited using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When exploited, a filename in a malicious archive is concatenated to the target extraction directory, which results in the final path ending up outside of the target folder. For instance, a zip may hold a file with a "../../file.exe" location and thus break out of the target folder. If an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily.
The following is an example of a zip archive with one benign file and one malicious file. Extracting the malicous file will result in traversing out of the target folder, ending up in /root/.ssh/ overwriting the authorized_keys file:
+2018-04-15 22:04:29 ..... 19 19 good.txt
+2018-04-15 22:04:42 ..... 20 20 ../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys