Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Affecting twisted package, versions [,26.10.0rc1)
Threat Intelligence
Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Start learning- Snyk IDSNYK-PYTHON-TWISTED-21692659
- published24 Oct 2026
- disclosed23 Oct 2026
- creditArkadiusz Marta
Introduced: 23 Oct 2026
NewCVE-2026-115776 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade Twisted to version 26.10.0rc1 or higher.
Overview
Twisted is an event-based network programming and multi-protocol integration framework.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via IRC.dataReceived in twisted.words.protocols.irc, which appends incoming data to an internal line buffer without enforcing a maximum length until the fix. A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust server memory by opening a TCP connection and continuously sending data that contains no line delimiter, causing the buffer to grow without bound for the lifetime of the connection.
PoC
On a standard Twisted words IRC server (the server `twistd words` runs, using `IRCUser`), an unauthenticated client opens a single TCP connection and continuously sends data that contains no line feed, never completing a line. Every chunk is appended to the connection's line buffer, and because no complete line is ever formed none of it is consumed, so the buffer grows by the full volume sent.
In a measured run against a real `IRCFactory` server, one unauthenticated connection sending 60 MB of line-feed-free data raised the server process resident memory from about 47 MB to 2966 MB (roughly 49 MB per MB sent) with the connection still open and no limit triggered. Sending the same volume as normal line-feed-terminated commands leaves memory flat, which isolates the cause to the missing line-length bound.
Note: The PoC states it was run against a real IRCFactory server using the twistd words IRC server with IRCUser, with an unauthenticated client sending 60 MB of line-feed-free data.