Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Twisted is an event-based network programming and multi-protocol integration framework.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling via the XML element stream parsers SuxElementStream and ExpatElementStream in twisted.words.xish.domish, which impose no limit on the byte size or element count of a single stanza. An attacker can open an XMPP stream, send a container element followed by an unbounded stream of child elements, and never send the container's closing tag. Because an element is emitted and dropped only when its end tag arrives while it sits directly under the document root, every child element is appended to the in-memory tree and retained indefinitely, allowing a low-bandwidth peer to exhaust server memory.
Note: This is only exploitable against endpoints that parse untrusted XML streams using this stack, such as an XMPP server, and the attack requires no authentication because the stream is parsed before the authentication phase.
On any endpoint that parses untrusted XML streams with this stack, such as an XMPP server, open a stream by sending the opening `stream:stream` tag and a container element, then stream child elements continuously and never send the container's closing tag. No credentials are required, because in XMPP the stream is parsed before authentication.
Every child is appended to the container and retained because the container is never emitted, and the transport applies no limit on the size of the unfinished document. Because each small element becomes a full object in memory the footprint is many times the traffic sent, so a modest-bandwidth peer, or several such streams, drives the process to memory exhaustion.
Note: The PoC states no specific versions, operating system, or non-default configuration beyond an XMPP server endpoint parsing untrusted XML streams with this stack.