CVE-2026-89607 Affecting cluster-md-kmp-default package, versions <5.14.21-150400.24.249.1


Severity

Recommended
0.0
high
0
10

Based on SUSE Linux Enterprise Server security rating.

Threat Intelligence

EPSS
0.17% (6th percentile)

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  • Snyk IDSNYK-SLES154-CLUSTERMDKMPDEFAULT-22609673
  • published19 Nov 2026
  • disclosed18 Nov 2026

Introduced: 18 Nov 2026

NewCVE-2026-89607  (opens in a new tab)

How to fix?

Upgrade SLES:15.4 cluster-md-kmp-default to version 5.14.21-150400.24.249.1 or higher.

NVD Description

Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream cluster-md-kmp-default package and not the cluster-md-kmp-default package as distributed by SLES. See How to fix? for SLES:15.4 relevant fixed versions and status.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ecryptfs: reject oversized encrypted_key_size in parse_tag_3_packet

parse_tag_3_packet() set encrypted_key_size from the Tag 3 packet body without bounding it against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64). When encrypted_key_size > 64, decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key() sets decrypted_key_size = encrypted_key_size and performs two out-of-bounds writes:

  1. crypto_skcipher_decrypt() writes encrypted_key_size bytes into decrypted_key[64] via scatterlist, overflowing into the parent ecryptfs_auth_tok struct.
  2. memcpy(crypt_stat->key, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size) writes into crypt_stat->key[64], corrupting root_iv, keysig_list, and mutexes in ecryptfs_crypt_stat.

Only AES-192 (cipher code 0x08) enables this because it sets crypt_stat->key_size = 24 independently of encrypted_key_size, allowing crypto_skcipher_setkey() to succeed while encrypted_key_size exceeds ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES.

The PKI decryption path (parse_tag_65_packet) already validates decrypted_key_size <= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES; the passphrase path omits this check.

Bound encrypted_key_size against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64) rather than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES (512). The 64-byte limit also protects the 512-byte encrypted_key[] buffer, so the former 512-byte check is removed as redundant.

[tyhicks: Adjust the code comment to refer to macros representing the buffer sizes rather than mentioning the buffer size values since they may change in the future]

CVSS Base Scores

version 3.1