CVE-2026-90220 Affecting kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default package, versions <1-150700.15.3.1
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-SLES157-KERNELLIVEPATCH6401507005390DEFAULT-22236924
- published5 Nov 2026
- disclosed3 Nov 2026
Introduced: 3 Nov 2026
NewCVE-2026-90220 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade SLES:15.7 kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default to version 1-150700.15.3.1 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default package and not the kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default package as distributed by SLES.
See How to fix? for SLES:15.7 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload
The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace.
That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload.
Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.
An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.
References
- https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-90220.html
- https://bugzilla.suse.com/1281781
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42c3f856d13a91a0d4c302a0c6854813621136db
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59e1592d3c270ff4642d5d6dc55c545306eb0693
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e6e471eef1d5d8cb056c7d364023fe048249204
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1e8d40663997aacaa198f37ce6893e07aaba77a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c92b2e6e418a3885758438dddcead6e954a9e095