CVE-2026-98186 Affecting kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default package, versions <1-150700.15.3.1
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-SLES157-KERNELLIVEPATCH6401507005390DEFAULT-22244315
- published5 Nov 2026
- disclosed3 Nov 2026
Introduced: 3 Nov 2026
NewCVE-2026-98186 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade SLES:15.7 kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default to version 1-150700.15.3.1 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default package and not the kernel-livepatch-6_4_0-150700_53_90-default package as distributed by SLES.
See How to fix? for SLES:15.7 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.
Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
References
- https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-98186.html
- https://bugzilla.suse.com/1284542
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2402c9e2644b7e10c7aaaf87bf12743d7e363559
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46cda9d42f0d6ec3057d878ddb1f38c0ab9f51df
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54a9cc5bd70b0d77a5069d4c46998c679a10c857
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58767b41f87244eebaa5a475b9d276c83b89b933
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77e642af7f2f6029e12a35c847c56cbd0466e799
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8bbef2b1ebfbadc0b9c37bbbf9c9e26fe2e41960
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/982b8fcdbb28f63bbbf02f0822c0bbda12ec27ed
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e667aee1c192d67d27c803007bfa9c6e0873e959