CVE-2026-31555 Affecting ocfs2-kmp-default package, versions <6.4.0-150700.53.63.1
Threat Intelligence
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applications- Snyk IDSNYK-SLES157-OCFS2KMPDEFAULT-17779271
- published2 Jul 2026
- disclosed1 Jul 2026
Introduced: 1 Jul 2026
NewCVE-2026-31555 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade SLES:15.7 ocfs2-kmp-default to version 6.4.0-150700.53.63.1 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream ocfs2-kmp-default package and not the ocfs2-kmp-default package as distributed by SLES.
See How to fix? for SLES:15.7 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:
WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524
When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.
After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 futex_lock_pi(uaddr) // acquires the PI futex exit() futex_cleanup_begin() futex_state = EXITING; futex_lock_pi(uaddr) futex_lock_pi_atomic() attach_to_pi_owner() // observes EXITING *exiting = owner; // takes ref return -EBUSY wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner) put_task_struct(); // drops ref // exiting still points to owner goto retry; futex_lock_pi_atomic() lock_pi_update_atomic() cmpxchg(uaddr) *uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever // value changed return -EAGAIN; wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)
Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.
References
- https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-31555.html
- https://bugzilla.suse.com/1263178
- https://bugzilla.suse.com/1263179
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/210d36d892de5195e6766c45519dfb1e65f3eb83
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33095ae3bdde5e5c264d7e88a2f3e7703a26c7aa
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e8e06bf8909e79b4acd950cf578cfc2f10bbefa
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71112e62807d1925dc3ae6188b11f8cfc85aec23
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7475dfad10a05a5bfadebf5f2499bd61b19ed293
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92e47ad03e03dbb5515bdf06444bf6b1e147310d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de7c0c04ad868f2cee6671b11c0a6d20421af1da
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7824ec168d2ac883a213cd1f4d6cc0816002a85