Uncontrolled Recursion Affecting gfs2-kmp-default package, versions <6.12.0-160000.6.1
Threat Intelligence
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Start learning- Snyk IDSNYK-SLES1600-GFS2KMPDEFAULT-14387016
- published11 Dec 2025
- disclosed25 Nov 2025
Introduced: 25 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-38493 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade SLES:16.0.0 gfs2-kmp-default to version 6.12.0-160000.6.1 or higher.
NVD Description
Note: Versions mentioned in the description apply only to the upstream gfs2-kmp-default package and not the gfs2-kmp-default package as distributed by SLES.
See How to fix? for SLES:16.0.0 relevant fixed versions and status.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()
We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving, with the following dmesg output:
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Call Trace: <TASK> ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60 __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80 timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390 vfs_read+0xe2/0x390 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210 ksys_read+0x73/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
__timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this:
struct stack_entry *entry; ... memcpy(&entry->caller, fstack->calls, size); entry->size = fstack->nr_entries;
Since commit e7186af7fb26 ("tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to kernel_stack event structure"), struct stack_entry marks its caller field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry->size contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow.
Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds check knows the correct size. This is analogous to __ftrace_trace_stack().
References
- https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-38493.html
- https://bugzilla.suse.com/1247283
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bb9ea515cda027c9e717e27fefcf34f092e7c41
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/823d798900481875ba6c68217af028c5ffd2976b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85a3bce695b361d85fc528e6fbb33e4c8089c806
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbf90f5aa7ac7cddc69148a71d58f12c8709ce2b